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THE MODERN STATUS OF THE RULES PERMITTING A
JUDGE TO PUNISH DIRECT CONTEMPT SUMMARILY
Summary contempt is a legal sanction deeply entrenched in the
Anglo-American judicial system. In general, a judge may impose
criminal penalties without a plenary hearing for conduct occurring
in the presence of the court.' This power creates a conflict between
judicial power to assure a smooth and unobstructed flow of justice
and fundamental notions of criminal procedural due process. 2 Because due process plays a central role in this country's legal system, courts must justify clearly any abridgment or modification of
procedural rights.
1. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 221 (1971).
Courts characterize contempt according to two schemes: criminal or civil contempts and

direct or indirect contempts. See, e.g., 0. Fiss & D.

RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONs

837-38 (2d ed.

1984). The criminal/civil distinction usually is based on the purpose for which the contempt
sentence is applied. If the sentence is remedial or corrective, the contempt is classified as
civil. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Vanderkooi v. Echelbarger, 250 Ind. 175, 179,
235 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1968); Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 317, 226 A.2d 304, 307 (1967);
Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 347, 65 N.E.2d 555, 557 (1946). On the
other hand, if the relief is punitive in nature the contempt is criminal. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Buckson v. Mancari, 43 Del. Ch. 236, -,
223 A.2d 81, 82 (1966); Shiflet v. State, 217
Tenn. 690, -,
400 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1966).
If the contempt is criminal, then constitutional safeguards for criminal trials will attach;
but if the contempt is civil, such safeguards will not attach. Cf. United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 295-301 (1947); Id. at 342, 363-76 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Additionally, civil sentences, at least incarcerations, are indeterminate-valid only while the
trial is in progress-because their purpose is to coerce compliance with the court's order.
See Shillitani,384 U.S. at 371; Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 74-77 (1948). Conversely, criminal sentences are determinate.
The distinction between indirect and direct contempts focuses on where or how the contempt was committed. If the conduct occurred in the presence of the court, the contempt is
direct; if it occurred outside the court's presence, the contempt is indirect. See, e.g., In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274-76 (1948); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1925).
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reinforces this distinction. Consequently, direct contempts are subject to summary disposition while indirect contempts must
be afforded notice and hearing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42; infra note 3.
2. Recognizing the unique features of this offense, courts have classified contempt as sui
generis-neither civil nor criminal. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Bessette
v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904). More recently, however, the Supreme Court
recognized that "criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
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Federal courts derive their summary contempt power from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42.1 After this rule became effective in 1946, courts broadly construed the scope of a federal court's
summary contempt power. 4 Recent developments, however, suggest
a narrowing of this power.5 This Note examines these developments and concludes that federal appellate courts should expand
their review of the exercise of summary contempt power by applying greater scrutiny to the trial record and by expressly deciding
whether prompt action was necessary.
ORIGIN AND POLICIES OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT

Origin
Early English common law recognized an inherent judicial power
to keep order in the court and to protect the court's dignity. Referring to Blackstone's Commentaries, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that early courts based
the contempt rationale on a theory of punishment for disturbance
of public justice.' Heavily influenced by the English tradition,
American courts basically accepted this rationale.7 In Anderson v.
Dunn,8 the Supreme Court imposed a requirement that contempt

3. Rule 42 states:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily
if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order
of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered
of record.
(b) Disposition upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as
provided in subdivision (a) of the rule shall be prosecuted on notice.. . . If the
contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is
disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's
consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing
the punishment.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 36-65.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 66-137.
6. United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984).
7. "Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation,
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to
their lawful mandates." Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
8. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). Although Anderson dealt with congressional contempt
power, id. at 230, subsequent cases cited Anderson for the proposition that courts are subject to the same limitation. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975);
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power be limited to the "least possible power adequate to the end
proposed. . . ."9 In the ensuing years, courts have noted this limitation, but whether they actually have adhered to it is less than

clear.
The Supreme Court further indicated its perception of the origin
and breadth of the contempt power in United States v. Shipp.10
The Court held in Shipp that the "[p]ower to punish for contempt
is inherent in all courts for the purpose of enforcing judgments and
orders and compelling submission to lawful mandates, as well as
for the purpose of preserving order and imposing respect and decorum in the presence of the court."1 1
In addition to tracing the origins of the contempt power to the
inherent powers of courts,1 2 federal courts also have found that the
contempt power stems from acts of Congress.1 3 In fact, the Supreme Court now adheres to the latter view.14 In accord with this
approach, Congress vested lower federal courts with the contempt
power in title 18, section 401, of the United States Code;1 5 in addiHarris v. United States, 362 U.S. 162, 165 (1965); United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12,
15 (2d Cir. 1984).
9. Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 231.
10. 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
11. Id. at 565 (citing Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 505 (1873); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)); see also Robinson, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) at 510.
12. See In re Atchison, 284 F. 604, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1922). The court provided its own question and answer: "Is the power of the courts to punish for the willful violation of an order
duly and properly made inherent in the court, or is it dependent upon legislation? It can
scarcely be questioned in this day that such power is inherent in the courts." Id.
13. See Ex parte Poulson, 19 F. Cas. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 11,350). The court
stated:
There can be no doubt of the constitutional power of congress to act upon
this subject [the contempt power], as far as respects our courts. It is no invasion of the rights of a suitor to bring or defend a suit, or in any way affects it
legal remedy, in the ordinary course of justice. It is in the discretion of the
legislative power to confer upon courts a summary jurisdiction to protect their
suitors or itself by summary process, or to deny it.
Id. The Supreme Court supported this view of the origin of the contempt powers for lower
federal courts when examining the impact of congressional action upon its own contempt
powers. The Court stated: "An act of Congress controls the courts of its own creation [i.e.,
lower federal courts], but not this court. . . ." Shipp, 203 U.S. at 566.
14. In Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), the Court referred to "the statute which
confers power on a federal court to punish for contempt." Id. at 6 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 401
(1982)).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). The section provides:
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tion, section 402 provides for criminal prosecution of contempts
also constituting crimes, but provides explicitly that "all other
cases of contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be
punished in conformity to the prevailing usages at law."' 6 The
statutory scheme thus permits the judiciary to determine which
types of contempt merit procedural due process and which types
may be punished summarily.
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines the
procedure for exercise of a federal court's contempt power. The
Supreme Court promulgated the rule in 1944, and it became effective in 1946 with Congress's acquiescence. 17 The rule was intended
to "make more explicit 'the prevailing usages at law' by which [section 402] has authorized punishment of contempts."' 8 Rule 42(b)
states the general rule, 19 requiring notice and hearing in all cases
except those instances that fall within the narrowly drawn exceptions of direct criminal contempt in rule 42(a), which is the operative vehicle for the summary contempt power. Rule 42(a) allows a
summary proceeding when the contempt was committed in the
presence of court and upon certification by the judge that he or she
saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt. This requirement was not a novel statutory innovation. The drafters of rule

A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as1. misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice;
2. misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
3. disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or
command.
Most courts have accepted that four requirements are necessary to support a criminal contempt conviction under § 401(1). First, the conduct at issue must constitute misbehavior;
second, the misbehavior must amount to an obstruction of the administration of justice;
third, the conduct must have taken place within the court's presence; and fourth, the actor
must have intended to obstruct justice. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 366-67 (7th
Cir. 1972); see Vaughn v. City of Flint, 752 F.2d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Warlick, 742 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1984); Gordon v. United States, 592 F.2d 1215, 1217-18
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912 (1979); United States ex rel. Robson v. Oliver, 470 F.2d
10, 12 (7th Cir. 1972).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1982) (emphasis added).
17. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952).
18. Id. at 7.
19. See supra note 3.
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42(a) intended
20
contempt.

to

codify

the preexisting

common

law of

Policies
The Supreme Court has advanced two alternative theories to
justify the summary contempt power. 21 The outcome of a particular case22depends largely upon which of these two theories a court
follows. Although the second approach is a more recent development than the first, it has not replaced the first approach completely. Resolving this dichotomy is imperative because a summary
criminal contempt conviction occurs without the formalities usually associated with a criminal proceeding; summary criminal contempt proceedings lack such safeguards as service of process, oral
arguments, briefs, witnesses, cross-examination, and trial by jury.2 3
Because summary contempt proceedings lack these safeguards,
courts must understand clearly when the use of such proceedings is
permissible.
The first approach permits the use of summary contempt proceedings whenever the offensive conduct occurs in the judge's presence. 24 Because the judge is present and observes the offensive conduct, further procedures designed to unveil the truth are
superfluous. The judge merely applies the law to the facts as he or
she sees them; no additional factual determination is needed. The

20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 advisory committee's note. The committee cited Ex parte Terry,
128 U.S. 289 (1888), and Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), as enunciations of
that law. But see Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 503-04 (1972) ("A legislature, like a court,
must, of necessity, possess the power to act 'immediately' and 'instantly' to quell disorders
in the chamber .... ).
21. Compare Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952) ("The Rule [FED. R. CRIM. P.
42] allows summary procedure only as to offenses within the knowledge of the judge because
they occurred in his presence.") with United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975)
summary contempt
("[W]hen [behavior] disrupts and frustrates an ongoing proceeding,.
").
must be available to vindicate the authority of the court . .
22. See generally Kuhns, The Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 39 (1978) (analyzing the summary contempt power in light of these
two rationales).
23. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9. In a nonsummary hearing, requirements of due process include
"the right to be adequately advised of charges, a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
by way of defense or mitigation, representation by counsel, and an adequate opportunity to
call witnesses." Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 n.9 (1964).
24. See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9; supra note 21.
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approach is designed to promote efficiency in the judicial process.15
A more critical analysis poses the further question of whether this
"summary" process is indeed sufficient to protect the liberty interest at stake. While this approach probably reflects a more accurate
literal interpretation of the language of rule 42(a), it is less satisfying than the second approach.
The second approach dictates that courts should use a summary
proceeding only to assure the smooth administration of justice and
to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom. This interpretation follows logically from the historical origins of the contempt
power.2 8 Courts must recognize that exercise of the summary contempt power essentially suspends procedural due process rights
and thus should use such power only when absolutely necessary to
prevent obstruction of the judicial process. 27 Courts should not adhere to the efficiency-based rationale of the first approach because,
when carried to its logical conclusion, it ignores the existence of
due process problems.
The effect of this dichotomy of rationales on the ultimate disposition of the case is profound. Appellate courts viewing summary
contempt under the first approach are more likely to sustain a
broader exercise of the summary power, permitting the use of this
power when immediate action is not necessary to maintain order or
salvage the proceedings.28 In contrast, courts analyzing summary
contempt based on the strict necessity rationale hold that the trial
judge should use the contempt power in more limited circumstances-when the judge has seen all relevant conduct and exercise

25. To justify the summary contempt power, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]o submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would
operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency." In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595
(1895).
26. Early Supreme Court decisions refer to the use of the contempt power as justified
when used to ensure order and decorum in the courtroom and to enforce court orders. See,
e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204 (1821).
27. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987).
28. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1021
(9th Cir. 1981).
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of the summary power is necessary to preserve the orderly functioning of the court.2"
THE FIRST APPROACH

Ex parte Terry3 0 provides an example of early Supreme Court
analysis of the summary contempt power. Purporting to rely on
the origin and development of the summary contempt power in
English and American legal history, the Court in Terry found no
inherent conflict between the summary contempt power and the
liberty of the citizen. The Court reasoned that if a judge could not
punish for contempt without notice and opportunity to be heard,
summary contempt could not exist at all.3 1 Because courts need
summary contempt to protect themselves and to discharge their
functions, the Court rejected the notion that courts must afford
notice and an opportunity to be heard in every summary contempt
proceeding.32
Although the Court recognized the potential for abuse and hasty
or arbitrary application, the Court did not believe that these criticisms justified the abolition of the power: "Confidence must be reposed somewhere; and if there should be an abuse, it will be a public grievance, for which a remedy may be applied by the legislature,
and is not to be devised by courts of justice."3 3
In the abstract, protection of individual liberties is compromised
when courts are unable to discharge their functions properly. Proponents of a strong summary contempt power assert that such a
power is needed to protect individual liberties by assuring an or-

29. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315-16, 319 (1975); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513-15 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497 (1974); Harris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164-65 (1965); United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1568
(11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. 128 U.S. 289 (1888). In Terry, the trial court had summarily convicted an attorney for
contempt after the attorney assaulted a marshal who, pursuant to the court's order, was
removing the attorney's wife from the courtroom. The attorney contested the contempt conviction on grounds of lack of notice and opportunity to be heard. Id. at 299.
31. Id. at 309.
32. Id. "The judicial eye witnessed the act and the judicial mind comprehended all the
circumstances of aggravation, provocation, or mitigation; and the fact being thus judicially
established, it only remained for the judicial arm to inflict proper punishment." Id. at 312
(quoting Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257, 268 (1876)).
33. Id.
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derly trial process.3 4 In practice, however, actual damage to the liberty of the citizen results from the exercise of summary contempt
power. The argument that contempt power is necessary certainly
carries substantial weight. The mere assertion that contempt
power should exist, however, does not answer the equally substantial objections to the summary exercise of that power.
Congress codified the principles of Terry in rule 42,36 and the
Supreme Court first reviewed the rule in Sacher v. United
States.37 In Sacher the Court considered whether a judge summarily could find a person in contempt at the conclusion of the trial
instead of exercising the power when the incidents actually occurred. At the conclusion of a nine-month trial of Communist
Party leaders for conspiracy to overthrow the government by force
or violence, the trial court found the defense attorneys and one of
the defendants, who had elected to represent himself, guilty of
contempt.3 8
The Supreme Court concluded that the same reasons that led to
the creation of a judicial contempt power mandate its being summary. 9 The Court stated that the primary purpose of a conventional trial court's procedures was to inform the court of events not

34. See, e.g., id. at 306-07. The Court acknowledged the "general rule" that courts must
afford defendants notice and an opportunity to be heard, but stated that with reference to
summary punishment for contempts committed "in the face of the Circuit Court,"
there is another rule, of almost immemorial antiquity, and universally acknowledged, which is equally vital to personal liberty, and to the preservation
of organized society, because upon its recognition and enforcement depend the
existence and authority of the tribunals established to protect the rights of the
citizen. . . . It has relation to the class of contempts which, being committed
in the face of a court, imply a purpose to destroy or impair its authority, to
obstruct the transaction of its business, or to insult or intimidate those charged
with the duty of administering the law.
Id. at 307.
35. Some commentators argue for abolishing the summary power altogether. See, e.g.,
Comment, Counsel and Contempt: A Suggestion That the Summary Power Be Eliminated,
18 DuQ. L. REv. 289 (1980) (concluding that the threat of a later conviction will deter obstructions of the judicial process as well as a conviction summarily imposed).
36. FED. R. CraM. P. 42 advisory committee's note. Rule 42 also encompasses the rationale
of Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1923), with regard to indirect contempts. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 42 advisory committee's note. Terry does not reach the question of conviction without hearing and notice when exercise of the power is delayed.
37. 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 8; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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previously within its knowledge. 40 As a result, such procedures are
not needed when courts exercise summary contempt power because
the court was aware of and had knowledge of the events warranting the proceedings.4 1
Although informing the court of events not within the court's
knowledge is an unquestionably important function of conventional court procedures, the ultimate purpose of those procedures
is to achieve justice and fairness. The reason that courts must be
informed of events not within their knowledge is to enable them to
provide the best decision under the circumstances for the individual litigants. The procedures dismissed so easily by the Supreme
Court in Sacher are the foundation of due process.
Undoubtedly influenced by the clearly contemptuous behavior of
the parties involved in Sacher,42 the Court held that the trial judge
had discretion to wait until the end of the trial before exercising
summary contempt power. 43 The Court stated that requiring immediate exercise of the summary contempt power could have a
more detrimental effect on the smooth functioning of the trial proceeding by depriving parties of counsel if the court immediately
imposed sentence or, if the court waited to sentence, by prejudicing the jury against a party by reprimanding the party's attorney
for misconduct. 44 The Court sought to avoid a construction of rule
42 which would allow counsel to use contemptuous conduct to ma-

40. Id. at 9.
41. Id.
42. The occurrences spurring the contempt charge included disobeying the court's instructions and orders to desist from disruptive behavior; ignoring the court's procedural instructions as to the timing and content of motions, offers of proof, etc.; repeatedly continuing to object and argue after the court had overruled objections; and making insulting and
insolent references to the court. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1950),
afl'd, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). The insulting references to the court included the following: "I
think lawyers who are defending their clients for their liberty should not be treated as
though they were dogs," id. at 438; "certain illusions. . . have been shattered because of the
prejudicial actions of the Court," id. at 442; "I rise, first of all, your Honor, to protest most
vigorously against the outrageous and arbitrary ruling which you have just made," id. at
442; direction to counsel to conclude arguments by a specific time "makes a mockery of
justice," id. at 442; "his Honor's mind is closed to any grounds that I might state," id. at
452; "I think it has been a sabotage of the entire system of justice in this court," id. at 435.
43. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9-10.
44. Id. at 10. The citation could not have occurred in private because by definition, contempt is a public crime and must be punished as such. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 27475 (1948).
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nipulate the trial. "Reasons for permitting straightway exercise of
summary power are not reasons for compelling or encouraging its
immediate exercise." 5 The prejudice caused by attorney contempt
citations should not become grounds for mistrial." The Court's
reasoning implies that discretion as to the time of citation and sentencing is necessary to avoid offensive use of contemptuous conduct, Requiring the trial judge to exercise summary contempt
power immediately could emasculate his or her ability to maintain
order.
The Court in Sacher further reasoned that a delay may be preferable to ensure a well-considered judgment. 47 Summary contempt
vests a great deal of power in the trial judge, power that may be
subject to arbitrary and uncontrolled use."8 The Supreme Court in
Sacher concluded that forcing judges to use the power immediately
or lose it would cause them to exercise it before fully considering
the issue.4 9 In many contempt cases the behavior of attorneys is
directed at the judge personally.5 0 While a judge should be expected to rise above personal attacks, a rule requiring immediate
exercise of summary contempt may detract from carefully reasoned and calculated judgments.5 1 The Court identified appellate
review as a remedy to hasty and heated judgments and as a protection for the vigorous advocacy of the trial bar.52 The Court did not
analyze its practical effectiveness fully, however.5 3

45. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9-10.
46. See id. at 10.
47. Id. at 10.
48. The Supreme Court in Sacher recognized the potential for abusing the summary contempt power. See id. at 12.
49. Id. ("If we were to hold that summary punishment can be imposed only instantly
upon the event, it would be an incentive to pronounce, while smarting under the irritation
of the contemptuous act, what should be a well-considered judgment.").
50. Id. at 9 (suggesting that an attorney should not resist or insult the judge, but should
note his objection and preserve his point for appeal).
51. But see infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
52. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 12-13.
53. Justice Black's dissent alluded to the inadequacy of appellate review in this case because the appellate court failed to scrutinize the record as presented. The record was very
long and the trial judge, instead of including a specific description of the actions he considered contemptuous, merely entered the whole transcript of thousands of pages into the certificate of contempt. Justice Black blamed this cursory treatment of the record on the lack
of traditional criminal proceedings. He argued that, had a hearing ensued, the appellate
court would have been forced to make a more well-reasoned decision:
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563

The dissents of Justices Black 54 and Frankfurter 5 provided the
basis for the Court's subsequent adoption of the narrower view of
the contempt power. They chose to rely on the necessity rationale
rather than the efficiency rationale, believing that the need for
summary proceedings is less compelling when the crisis has passed.
Adopting the sentiments of Justice Holmes, Justice Black concluded that when immediate action is not necessary, courts should
treat a contempt like any other breach of law and that it "should
be dealt with as the law deals with other illegal acts," providing a
full panoply of procedures. 56
Justice Black also considered the added value of procedural safeguards when the judge had been involved personally. 57 The appendix in Sacher5a disclosed a personal animosity between the judge
and the defense counsel. Additionally, the trial involved a sensitive, highly controversial issue that may have caused the judge to
harbor prejudices that affected his objectivity. In the hands of one
so influenced, the contempt power is an awesome weapon.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent centered on two themes: the importance of procedural regularity and the scope of the summary power
when the judge is the target of the attack or insult. Recognizing
the summary contempt power as an exception to due process, he
defined the power as a means of assuring the enforcement of justice according to the law. 59 Observing the open-ended language of

rule 42(a), Frankfurter reasoned that the rule was subject to a limitation inherent in all grants of power: The power must be used

A fair review requires scrutiny of 13,000 pages of evidence most of which is

irrelevant. ...

Such a record obscured these lawyers' trial conduct in a maze

of evidence that has nothing to do with their own guilt or innocence. It is not

surprising that this court shrinks from reading such a record; it refuses to do
so. No assertion is made that the Court of Appeals waded through it ....
Such an "inadequate" basis of review is to be expected since no hearing was
held which could have framed concrete issues and focused attention on evidence relevant to them.
Id. at 18-19 (Black, J., dissenting); see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
54. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 14 (Black, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 22 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247
U.S. 402, 425-26 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 42.
59. Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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fairly for the purpose conferred.60 Use of the contempt power in a
way contrary to traditional due process therefore must be justified
by some compelling necessity,6 ' such as maintaining order in the
court or salvaging the proceedings. Frankfurter indicated that if a
judge has been personally attacked or insulted, only a compelling
necessity will justify use of the summary power during trial;62 however, when a judge waits until the end of the trial to exercise the
power after being personally involved, no possible necessity exists
to justify a summary exercise of the court's contempt power.6 3 Justice Frankfurter pointed out also that rule 42(a) permits, but does
not command, summary punishment of all direct contempts.64 Justice Frankfurter's dissent foreshadowed the later line of cases limiting exercise of summary power when a judge is "personally embroiled" with the alleged contemnor 5
THE SECOND APPROACH

In Bloom v. Illinois,66 the Supreme Court dealt a forceful blow
to the expansive view of summary contempt power formulated in
Sacher. Bloom involved the constitutional right to a jury trial for
an indirect contempt punished by a two-year prison term. The
contemnor had petitioned to probate a will he knew had been
falsely prepared and executed after the death of the testator, thus
leading to the contempt conviction in the state court. The Supreme Court held that an indirect contempt carrying a "serious"
7
punishment required a jury trial.
The Court did not consider punishment for direct contempt in
federal court in Bloom. The Court did introduce rule 42(a) into its
analysis, however, noting that the right to a jury trial did not at60. Id. at 26.
61. Id. The two restrictions Justice Frankfurter noted are that: 1) no judge should sit in a
case on which he is personally involved and 2) no criminal punishment should be meted out
without notice and hearing unless overriding necessity precludes such indispensable safeguards. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 29-30 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821).
62. 343 U.S. at 37.
63. Id. at 36-37.
64. Id. at 29, 36-37.
65. See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
66. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
67. Id. at 198-200, 202.
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tach to direct contempts because, it assumed, direct contempt constitutes a "petty" offense.68 More significantly, the Court recognized that rule 42(a) was not only based on the premise that factfinding is unnecessary for contempts committed in the presence of
the judge. Instead, the Court stated, summary contempt "also rests
on the need to maintain order and a deliberative atmosphere in
the courtroom. 6e Thus, the Court acknowledged the necessity rationale as a basis for rule 42(a).
PersonalEmbroilment
As interpreted in United States v. Meyer, 0 Sacher held that
personal attacks on the trial judge never could extinguish the trial
judge's summary power under rule 42(a), even after the trial's completion, because contempt occurring in the presence of the court is
the only prerequisite to vesting of the summary power in the trial
judge.7 1 Courts since have eroded this interpretation of Sacher in
regard to the adjudication of contempt charges when the judge is
the target of contempt.
Two years after Sacher, the Supreme Court decided Offutt v.
United States. 2 In Offutt, the Court refused to allow the trial
judge who cited the contempt to sit on the post-trial contempt
hearing because it feared judicial prejudice. The judge had been
"personally embroiled" in a continuing conflict with the alleged
contemnor. 73

The relationship between the judge and the defense counsel in
Offutt is similar to aspects of Sacher; in both cases the judge's
statements tended to provoke a hostile reaction from the contemnor. Also, both trial judges waited until the conclusion of the trial
68. See id. at 210. Presumably, the Court intended that the right to a jury trial would
apply to direct contempts subject to "serious" punishment. The Court stated that no exception to the jury trial right should be made for disorders in the courtroom. Id. The only
reason that rule 42(a) summary punishment could not be applied is that direct contempts
are "placed . . .under the rule that petty crimes need not be tried to a jury." Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
71. Id. at 835.
72. 348 U.S. 11 (1954). During an abortion trial, the court held defendant's attorney in
contempt for disregarding the court's rulings and overstepping the bounds of aggressive advocacy. Id. at 12; see Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
73. Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17.
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to cite the contempt; thus, they did not exercise summary power
because of any compelling need to restore order in the courtroom.7 4
In contrast to Sacher, however, the Court in Offutt reversed the
contempt conviction and remanded the case for reconsideration by
a different trial judge-one who had not been involved personally
in a clash with the defense counsel. 75 As in his dissent in Sacher,
Justice Frankfurter, now writing for the majority, emphasized the
aspect of procedural regularity in the fair administration of justice.78 The Court recognized that despite their best efforts, judges
can become involved personally in such situations. Without condoning the contemptuous behavior of the lawyer, therefore, the
77
Court applied a rule first enunciated in Cooke v. United States:
When conditions become impracticable, or when delay would not
injure a public or private right, a judge properly may ask another
judge to take his place "in a case of contempt by personal attack
'78
upon him.
The Court has continued this trend toward narrowing summary
contempt power in cases of personal attacks on the judge using the
necessity rationale for support. In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,79 the
judge remained detached and restrained" despite the contemnor's

74. See id. at 12; Sacher, 343 U.S. at 3, 42-89.
75. Offutt, 348 U.S. at 17-18.
76. Id. at 17.
77. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
78. Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925)).
But see Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (finding trial judge not "personally embroiled" and thus allowed to sit on the post-trial hearing).
79. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
80. The Court factually distinguished Oflutt, recognizing that in Mayberry the judge had
not become personally embroiled. Id. at 465.
Justice Harlan, concurring in Mayberry, observed that the severity of the 22-year sentence imposed for the contempt charge may suggest partiality. Id. at 469 (Harlan, J., concurring). Similarly, in a later case the Court suggested that the four and one-half year sentence imposed reflected the extent of the judge's involvement. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488, 502-03 (1974).
In addition to requiring a new judge for a hearing under the "personal embroilment"
theory, the length of sentences imposed in Mayberry and Taylor also would require that the
accused contemnor be granted the right to a jury trial. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 211
(1968), the Court held that the right to a jury trial attached to contempt citations subject to
.'serious" punishment. Id. at 198-200, 202; see supra text accompanying notes 67-68. In reference to indirect contempts subject to "serious" punishment, the Court stated:
We place little credence in the notion that the independence of the judiciary
hangs on the power to try contempts summarily and are not persuaded that
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abusive attacks on him.81 Despite this detachment, however, the
Supreme Court held the use of the summary power inappropriate.
The Court reasoned that when judges wait until the end of the
trial to act, they should ask a fellow judge to take their place, especially when "the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal
stings. .

.

.No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that

calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication."82
By the time the Court decided Taylor v. Hayes83 and Codispoti
v. Pennsylvania"" in 1974, the necessity rationale firmly was implanted, as evidenced by the Court's reference in Taylor to the
' In Codispoti,88
"usual justification of necessity."85
the Court referred to the lack of an "overriding necessity for instant action to
preserve order and no justification for dispensing with the ordinary
rudiments of due process.''87 Taylor and Codispoti also involved
situations in which the judge cited the contempts as they occurred
the additional time and expense possibly involved in submitting serious contempts to juries will seriously handicap the effective functioning of the courts
.... When a serious contempt is at issue, considerations of efficiency must
give way to the more fundamental interest of ensuring the even-handed exercise of judicial power.
Id. at 208-09. Although discussing summary punishment of indirect contempts, the reasoning readily applies to direct contempts. The Court made a conscious choice in favor of procedural regularity over efficiency whenever the punishment is serious.
81. The defendant, charged with prison breach and holding hostages in a penal institution, elected to represent himself at trial. In addition to repeated interruptions, outbursts,
and refusals to obey the court, Mayberry verbally assaulted the judge, calling him a "dirty
sonofabitch," id. at 456; referred to the judge as a "dirty tyrannical old dog," id. at 457; said
"I ask your Honor to keep your mouth shut while I'm questioning my own witness. Will you
do that for me?" id. at 458; and said "Go to hell. I don't give a good God damn what you
suggest, you stumbling dog," id. For a more detailed account of the exchange see id. at 45662.
82. Id. at 463-64, 465.
83. 418 U.S. 488 (1974). See generally Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of
the Summary Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945 (1975) (examination of Taylor and survey of the use of summary contempt proceedings to punish a defense attorney for conduct during trial).
84. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
85. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 497 (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), as
precedent).
86. Codispoti was a co-defendant in the Mayberry trial. 418 U.S. at 507. Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania was the appeal from the contempt hearing with a different judge, as ordered
in Mayberry, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). The issue on appeal focused on the defendant's right to a
jury trial on the contempt charge.
87. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 515.
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but deferred sentencing until after the trial. Finding that the judge
had become "embroiled in a running controversy with petitioner,"
the Court in Taylor concluded that precedent s required adjudication by another judge.8 9
These rulings stand in sharp contrast to the broad authority
granted in Sacher on relatively similar facts. Taken together, these
cases require an inquiry not only into actual bias, but also into the
likelihood or appearance of bias. Even the appearance of bias requires recusal to satisfy both the reality and the appearance of
justice.90
Immediate Need Requirement
Harris v. United States"1 was an early Supreme Court attempt
to narrow the scope of the summary contempt power. It marked a
turning point in the evolution of the contempt power because it
focused on the exercise of summary power to vindicate the court's
authority and to preserve the judicial process. In a short five-tofour opinion, the Court characterized the summary contempt
power as designed to fill the need for immediate penal vindication
of the dignity of the court.92 In Harris,a witness testifying before a
grand jury refused to answer a question after being granted immunity from prosecution. Presumably to coerce the testimony, the
witness and grand jury were brought before the district court. The
judge repeated the questions, directed the witness to answer, and
affirmed the grant of immunity. When the witness still refused to
respond, the judge treated the witness's conduct as a direct con88. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575,
588 (1964); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
89. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501-02.
90. See, e.g., id. at 501. The Supreme Court also has required disposition by an impartial
judge when the judge adopts an adversarial position with respect to the alleged contemnor,
even if he has not been personally attacked. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212,
215-16 (1971) (trial judge had been named as a defendant by alleged contemnor in civil
suit); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137-39 (1955) (contemnor refused to answer questions
at trial which previously had been propounded by trial judge acting as a one-man grand jury
pursuant to Michigan law).
91. 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
92. Id. at 164.
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569

tempt warranting summary punishment.9 3 The Supreme Court reversed the contempt charge, holding first that if any contempt had
occurred at all, it had occurred before the grand jury, not the
court. In addition, the Court held that the absence of a justifiable
immediacy precluded use of the summary power. 94
Because rule 42(a) requires that the contempt occur "in the actual presence of the court," the ruling that the contempt did not
occur before the court would have provided sufficient grounds for
reversal. Having surmised that the witness was brought before the
judge for the purpose of satisfying rule 42(a), the Court could have
limited the scope of its decision by holding simply that "presence"
under rule 42(a) cannot be manufactured. The Court explicitly
stated that the use of rule 42(a) is reserved for "those unusual situations . . . where instant action is necessary to protect the judicial
institution itself."9 5 In essence, the Court adopted the necessity rationale for justifying use of the summary contempt power in federal courts.
Harris, coupled with United States v. Wilson,9 6 decided ten
years later, has effectively imposed an additional requirement for
properly invoking the summary power. A direct threat impeding
the judicial process seems to have become a prerequisite.9
Wilson sustained use of the summary power under facts quite
similar to those of Harris.As in Harris,the Court in Wilson addressed the refusal of a witness to testify after having been granted
immunity, but in Wilson the setting was a trial, not a grand jury

93. United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd, 382 U.S. 162
(1965).
94. Harris, 382 U.S. at 164, 165.
95. Id. at 167.
96. 421 U.S. 309 (1975).
97. One might argue that a key witness's refusal to testify before a grand jury impedes
the criminal judicial system. But see United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 318 (1975) (explaining that the grand jury could interview other witnesses or move on to other
investigations).
In his dissent in Harris,Justice Stewart pointed out that a grand jury, as merely an arm
of the court's process, has no power to compel witnesses to testify. Because the court has the
power to summon the witnesses to the grand jury, the court also must hold the power to
make witnesses testify. Thus, such a refusal arguably occurs in the presence of the court
and, therefore, correctly can be classified as a direct contempt warranting use of the summary power. Harris, 382 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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hearing.9 8 Although distinguishing Harris on this fact, the Court in
Wilson used the same basic analysis that it had applied in Harris,
concluding that a greater obstruction was likely to result in Wilson-type cases than in Harris-type cases.'9 The Court in Wilson,
though purporting to limit Harris,merely reaffirmed that the refusal to testify in court had occurred in the presence of the court
and properly was punishable by summary contempt because it has
an obstructive effect. 100 The contempt power is thus necessary to
prevent the obstruction. 1 1
Wilson is important for another reason. It advanced a third rationale for use of the summary contempt power. Instead of relying
on efficiency or immediate vindication of the court's dignity, the
Court in Wilson advanced a coercive function. The trial judge in
Wilson told the contemnor that the judge would reduce or even
void the sentence if the contemnor changed his mind and testified. 102 The Supreme Court sustained this purpose. 10 3 Typically the
distinguishing factor between civil and criminal contempts,'0 4 this
coercive feature is novel to direct criminal contempt convictions.
While advocating a return to a broader discretionary power, the
Court in Wilson effectively affirmed the trend toward a more restrictive use of the power. Nowhere does the Court consider the
Sacher conclusions that summary contempt refers only to the process and is available merely because the contempt occurred in the
presence of the judge. Rather, the Court in Wilson required an investigation into the effect of the behavior on the proceeding,
thereby forcing a judge to justify his decision to find one in contempt in terms of necessity and immediacy. The underlying theme
98. United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231, 1232 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 309
(1975).

99. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 318-19.
100. Id. at 314-16. "Harris, at most, now stands for nothing more than the proposition
that a witness' refusal to answer grand jury questions is not conduct 'in the actual presence
of the court.'" Id. at 321 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

101. Id. at 319; see also Harris, 382 U.S. at 164.
102. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 312.
103. "[S]ummary contempt must be available to vindicate the authority of the court as
well as to provide the recalcitrant witness with some incentive to testify. Whether such incentive is necessary in a particular case is a matter the Rule wisely leaves to the discretion

of the trial court." Id. at 316-17 (citation omitted); see also Kuhns, supra note 22, at 92-98
(discussing the coercive feature of criminal contempt in the context of Wilson).
104. See supra note 1 (discussing the distinction between civil and criminal contempts).
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is to allow a trial judge to "act swiftly and firmly to prevent contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress of a criminal

trial."10 5
Appellate Application of Harris and Wilson
Although Harrisand Wilson arguably rely on the same necessity
justification of the summary contempt power, the divergent results
in the two cases has led to inconsistent application of the cases'
principles in the federal circuits. Following the appellate cases
chronologically, the circuit courts have tended to limit the summary contempt power through the necessity rationale; however,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has curtailed the importance of necessity in reviewing the exercise of summary contempt power. Furthermore, even when limiting the reach
of summary contempt power, the Ninth Circuit has done so within
a Sacher "full knowledge of the facts" framework.
The Ninth Circuit took a Sacher-like view of summary contempt
in its en banc rehearing of In re Gustafson.10 The Court read Harris and Wilson as defining the prerequisites of summary punishment to be only those set out in rule 42(a), 0 7 ignoring those parts
of the opinions calling for a compelling exigency. Although the
court in Gustafson recognized that the Suprdme Court in Wilson
distinguished Harris on the need for immediate action, it concluded that the importance of this factor lies in the requirement
that the trial judge consider the necessity of summary punishment. 10 8 The Ninth Circuit focused on whether the trial judge
abused his discretion in deciding to impose summary contempt.

105. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 315-17.
106. 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The defense attorney, Gustafson, read his
closing argument to the jury from a prepared text. He read so fast that the judge had to ask
him 19 times to slow down. Ultimately the court had to tape Gustafson's remarks in order to
transcribe them. In addition, during the trial Gustafson suggested to the jury that the court
and prosecutor had conspired to obstruct his defense of his clients. Id. at 1018-19. Finding
that Gustafson's conduct neither created a material obstruction of the trial nor presented a
compelling need for immediate action, the court initially required a hearing for adjudication
of the contempt charge. In re Gustafson, 619 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980). Upon rehearing en
banc, the court affirmed the exercise of the summary power. In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017
(9th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
107. Gustafson, 650 F.2d at 1021-22.
108. Id. at 1022.
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The court formulated a standard of review which gives "great deference to a trial judge's explicit determination that plenary procedures are inadequate and summary procedures are necessary."109
Under this standard of review, appellate courts rarely would overturn a trial judge's action as long as he or she stated for the record
that summary procedures were required. Because the trial judge
needs only to consider the necessity of summary punishment under
Gustafson, the case runs contrary to the trend narrowing the trial
judge's summary contempt power. 110
The vigorous dissent by Judge Boochever in Gustafson was more
consistent with the reasoning in Harris and Wilson. Judge
Boochever interpreted these two cases as imposing a prerequisite
of exigency and denied that the trial court has discretionary power
in the summary contempt decision-what Judge Boochever identified as the decision to dispense with due process requirements.'
In Matter of Heathcock,"2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit provided an analysis more harmonious
with Harris and Wilson than that found in Gustafson. The Eleventh Circuit clearly identified the purpose of the summary contempt power as providing a court with "immediate means of discipline to vindicate and preserve the authority of the court.""'
109. Id. at 1023.
110. See Comment, Summary Criminal Contempt: Deference to the Trial Court, 12
GOLDEN GATE

U.L. REV. 109 (1982) (discussing the implications of the Gustafson decisions).

111. Gustafson, 650 F.2d at 1023 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
112. 696 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1983).
113. Id. at 1365. The Eleventh Circuit recently had the opportunity to address the necessity rationale more explicitly. In United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1987),

the Eleventh Circuit reversed the summary contempt conviction of an attorney who followed a particular line of questioning against the trial judge's explicit orders. The appellate

court acknowledged that the "explicit pre-conditions to resort to Rule 42(a) were met in
this case." Id. at 1568 (emphasis added). The court noted, however, that "authoritative judicial precedent embodies at least one further pre-condition: that there has been an actual
obstruction of justice." Id. (citing In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 234 (1962)). The court
concluded:
[W]e cannot accept that even if it constituted a clear violation of a clear order,
the single question and the answer it evoked constituted an actual obstruction
of justice, permitting resort to Rule 42(a). The decision whether to resort to
Rule 42(a) summary procedure, as contrasted with Rule 42(b)'s more elaborate
procedure, is spoken of as a matter of discretion. Viewed in those terms, we
conclude that the discretion was abused.
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The trial court in Heathcock issued a summary contempt citation to punish a violation of a court order enjoining employees of a
nursing facility from striking and demonstrating in front of the
building. When the judge was notified that the employees persisted, he went to the nursing home, observed the behavior, identified himself as the presiding judge, and proceeded to find a number of the petitioners in contempt of court." 4 The issue on appeal
was whether this behavior had occurred in the presence of court so
as to make summary contempt an appropriate remedy. The court
of appeals held that although "in the presence of court" was not
strictly limited to the courtroom, some degree of formality was required to sustain the charge outside of the courtroom. The informality of this situation defeated the propriety of being "in the
presence of court." 15
Following Harris and Wilson, the court in Heathcock analyzed
the scope of summary contempt power within the confines of the
necessity rationale."' Instead of focusing on the "immediacy" aspect of the necessity rationale, the court limited the scope of summary contempt power through a narrow reading of the "in.the
presence of court" requirement of rule 42(a).

17

The court in

Heathcock did not need to invoke an immediacy analysis because
the judge left the court to find the contemptuous conduct.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided United States v.Lumumbal s using a Wilson immediacy
analysis. In a case factually similar to Sacher," 9 the court held
114. Id. at 1363-64.
115. Id. at 1366.
116. See id. at 1365. The court stated that the purpose of summary contempt is "to pro-

vide the court with an immediate means of discipline to vindicate and preserve the authority of the court." Id.
117. Historically, appellate courts have affirmed broad interpretations of the "in the presence of court" requirement. See, e.g., Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 147 N.W.2d
886 (1967) (sustaining judge's power summarily to hold in contempt two juveniles, against
whom proceedings were pending in the judge's court, who had attacked the judge outside his
home late one night); People v. Higgins, 173 Misc. 96, 16 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(holding that a deputy sheriff, who secretly purchased liquor for jurors, became drunk, and
had sexual intercourse with a woman juror while guarding the jury, was guilty of contempt
in the presence of court).
118. 741 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1984).
119. Lumumba successfully represented one of 11 co-defendants on charges arising from a
Brinks robbery. United States v. Shakur, 543 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Twice during
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that by waiting until the end of the trial to adjudicate an attorney
in contempt, the trial judge had lost the power to invoke a summary conviction under rule 42(a).' Drawing on the concept of
least possible power adequate to the end proposed,' 2 ' the court
reasoned that due process rights are sometimes sacrificed for order
in the court, but when the interest in order need not be vindicated,
the least possible power to accomplish the ends perceived consists
122
of a rule 42(b) proceeding.
Acknowledging the similarity to Sacher, the court dismissed
Sacher as "not the present rule" and as having "limited vitality as
l2 3 It
precedent, even though it has not been expressly disavowed.'
relied on Supreme Court decisions after Sacher124 to trace the justification of summary punishment
as an "immediate necessity to
2 5
uphold a tribunal's authority.'
The case of United States v. Flynt,12 decided in the Ninth Circuit after Gustafson, does not use a Harris/Wilson analysis but
still effectively narrows the scope of the summary contempt power
by analyzing the requirement that the judge observe all relevant

the five-month trial, the trial judge cited Lumumba for contempt. He did not, however,
finally adjudicate the charges until the trial concluded. Lumumba repeatedly refused to remain seated and silent during voir dire in direct defiance of the court's order, provoking the
first charge. The second charge came after the court directed Lumumba to make an offer of
proof with respect to his cross-examination of a government witness. Lumumba concluded
his offer of proof by remarking, "[A]nother point is I would like some kind of ruling on why
you won't let me do what you let them do and then have the audacity to sit on the bench
and claim you are fair." Lumumba, 741 F.2d at 14; see supra note 42.
120. Lumumba, 741 F.2d at 15-17. As an example of the difficulty inherent in policing
trial court actions through appellate review of contempt citations, on remand the district
judge refused to restrict the previous trial judge's power to punish for summary contempt to
the extent the appellate court intended. See United States v. Lumumba, 603 F. Supp. 913,
919-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Although never disapproving of the necessity justification, the district court broadly construed the hearing requirement. The defendant had notice that his
conduct was considered contemptuous, compare id. with Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488
(1974), and the district court interpreted the opportunity granted by the trial judge for the
contemnor to speak in his own behalf before punishment was imposed as adequate to meet
due process requirements of notice and hearing. 603 F. Supp. at 920.
121. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227-28 (1821).
122. Lumumba, 741 F.2d at 16.
123. Id.
124. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971);
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
125. Lumumba, 741 F.2d at 16.
126. 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985).
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facts. On its face, the conduct of the defendant, Larry Flynt, was
blatantly contumacious. He subjected the judicial authorities
before whom he appeared to a most vulgar onslaught of obscenities
and verbal abuse, 2 7 but because some legitimate question existed
as to Flynt's mental state and his ability to form the requisite intent to commit a contempt the Ninth Circuit deemed the use of
summary power inappropriate. 12 8
The court in Flynt acknowledged dual justifications for the summary contempt power. First, the need to overcome obstructions to
ongoing proceedings mandates a summary proceeding, and second,
because the judge is personally aware of the conduct, a hearing becomes unnecessary."" Showing less deference to the discretion of
trial judges than in Gustafson, the court recognized that appellate
courts have found abuses of discretion when the power is not exercised in a manner consistent with both justifications. 130
The court in Flynt used a Sacher analysis, requiring the judge to
have full and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts. It concluded that a rule 42(b) proceeding was necessary to inform the
court of events not within its knowledge, such as Flynt's mental
state.' Because Flynt's mental capacity to commit a contempt
was a "substantial issue,"
the court held that a rule 42(b) hearing
32
should have ensued.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed summary contempt in Vaughn v. City of Flint. 33 Vaughn
was accused of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law after
he purported to represent the residents of Oak Park through a judicial process. The court in Vaughn relied upon dual grounds to
127. See id. at 1355 n.1, 1357 nn.4-6 (reporting portions of the record detailing the contumacious exchanges).
128. Id. at 1366.
129. Id. at 1363.
130. Whether the Ninth Circuit in Flynt elevated immediacy from a factor that must be
considered by the trial judge, as in Gustafson, to a requirement for use of summary contempt power is unclear. The court first stated that the exercise of summary contempt power
must be consistent with the justifications enumerated for rule 42(a). See id. The court then
diluted the apparent requirement, however, when it noted that "appellate courts have found
abuses of discretion when both justifications" are not met. Id.
131. Id. at 1365.
132. Id. at 1364-66.
133. 752 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
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reverse the contempt citation, possibly going beyond Harris in its
relaxation of summary contempt power. First, the court relied on
the necessity rationale when it acknowledged that the trial judge's
order striking the pleadings and dismissing the cause disposed of
the case, thus eliminating any need for "summary vindication of
the court's dignity and authority.' 13 4 Second, the court devoted the
bulk of its analysis to the lack of a showing of intent to obstruct,
one of the elements underlying a finding of contempt. 135 By emphasizing the requisite intent finding, the court could forestall use
of the summary contempt power in all but the most disruptive instances of contempt.
This survey of recent federal circuit contempt cases demonstrates that the majority view now embraces the necessity rationale. In addition, courts have interpreted carefully other requisite
elements of the contempt violation to limit a trial judge's power to
punish summarily for direct criminal contempts. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit narrowly construed the "in the presence of the
court" requirement of rule 42(a), 3 6 and the Sixth Circuit emphasized the "intent" to commit the contempt in a manner that limits
13 7
the scope of summary power.
OPINION, ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

A concern that has plagued courts and scholars in considering
the desirability of a summary contempt power is its potential for
abuse. 3 Even with the best intentions of dispensing justice, judges
who personally have been insulted can lose their objectivity in adjudicating a contempt charge. A judge who has become emotionally
charged by personal attacks carries a powerful weapon in the form
of the summary contempt power. Responding to this dilemma, the
Supreme Court has narrowed the type of cases in which a judge
who presided over the contemptuous behavior may preside over

134. Id. at 1169 (quoting Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965)).
135. See supra note 15.
136. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1
(1952); see also Dobbs, supra note 1; Kuhns, supra note 22; Comment, supra note 35; Comment, supra note 110. See generally Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202-08 (historically tracing the
abuse question and various attempts to address it).
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the contempt hearing. 39 This step, however, may not address the
problem sufficiently.
Use of the summary contempt power to vindicate a personal
grudge is contrary to the policies which justify the contempt
power. From the Sacher perspective, a judge's perception of the
event is the determinative factor, but a judge's perception might
be distorted by personal involvement. Such an involvement does
not fit into the efficiency rationale because true efficiency requires
valid results in addition to swift disposition. The efficiency rationale presupposes a competent fact finder, for only on that assumption is a hearing a useless formality. 40 Considerations of efficiency
pale when compared to the possibility that a judge may abuse the
power and infringe on fundamental notions of fairness through
procedural due process. If a procedure is efficient, but inherently
unfair, it cannot be rationalized as an acceptable method of dealing with undesirable behavior.
From the rationale of the Harris/Wilsonprogeny, the possibility
that a judge may abuse the contempt power to vindicate a personal
grudge is also problematic.14 1 A Sacher criticism of the necessity
rationale is that it encourages judges to enter contempt convictions
when they are most likely to be acting on impulse, still "smarting
from the attack," for fear that if they walt, a hearing must ensue.1 42 If a judge, hastily imposing a contempt citation under the
immediacy requisite, is likely to act from a purely emotional response to the attack, the problem of judicial abuse of discretion is
magnified. Neither rationale squares with the problem for, instead
of contributing to the answer, each contributes to the dilemma.
Courts have tended to respond to the abuse problem by offering
appellate review as a remedy. 143 Practically, however, one must

139. See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
388 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11 (1954).
140. See United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
141. Indeed, as early as Bloom v. Illinois, the Supreme Court recognized the danger of
abuse. In calling for a jury trial, the Court found protection against arbitrary exercise to be
"an even more compelling argument" in contempt cases than in cases of other serious
crimes. 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).
142. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1952).
143. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 199-200 (1958); Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1952).
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consider the effectiveness of such review. Two basic criticisms of
appellate review in contempt cases exist. The first concerns the adequacy of the substantive review-what the court will examine and
what standard it will use. The second concerns the record itself
and how well it preserves the exchange.
When an appellate court reviews a summary contempt charge,
exactly what the court will consider varies. The most disturbing
recent case on this point is In re Gustafson,"' in which the Ninth
Circuit confined its inquiry to whether the trial court abused its
discretion in exercising the summary contempt power. The court in
Gustafson did not examine whether the contemnor's behavior was,
in fact, contemptuous. 14 5 The standard of review that the court
chose to apply was that of "great deference to a trial judge's explicit determination that plenary procedures are inadequate and
summary procedures are necessary."' 46 This standard "will safe47
guard an alleged contemnor from only the most flagrant abuses."'
Gustafson suggests that the trial judge has not abused his discretion if he includes a conclusory statement in the contempt order
that summary punishment is appropriate. 4 For an alleged contemnor to bring that decision into question may prove
impossible.'4 9
Sacher exposes another possible inadequacy of appellate review.
Will the court be willing to examine the record? Justice Black's
dissent strongly maintains that when an appellate court is unwilling to wade through a lengthy record but merely sustains the trial
court's decision that the contempt occurred, review is
150
inadequate.
This problem identified by Black in Sacher coupled with the
Gusfa/son analysis creates a potential for abuse that sharply conflicts with the due process considerations generally regarded as
crucial to the disposition of criminal cases. If an appellate court

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

650 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1022-23.
Id. at 1023.
Comment, supra note 110, at 113-14.
Gustafson, 650 F.2d at 1023.
Comment, supra note 110, at 114; see supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
Sacher, 343 U.S. at 14 (Black, J., dissenting); see supra note 53 and accompanying
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fails to read and consider the record, gives great deference to a
trial judge's conclusion that summary procedures are necessary,
and reviews the decision with an eye only to abuse of discretion,
little procedural protection is actually afforded an alleged contemnor. Under such circumstances, a contempt citation at the trial
court level is final in all practical respects. To avoid this problem,
when a trial judge suspends the usual requirements of notice and
hearing by issuing a summary contempt order, appellate courts
should review these appeals even more carefully than appeals of
other cases where the judicial system has afforded such procedural
safeguards.
The response of preventing judicial abuse only when the judge
has become personally embroiled in the conflict is inadequate because it only addresses the situation in which the judge waits until
after the trial to cite or punish the contempt.1 5 ' The response fails
to address the situation in which judges punish contempt immediately after it occurs. Thus, appellate review affords less protection
from immediate dispositions which may have ensued as a result of
a judge's anger or hostility. Protection effectively is denied in cases
when it is needed most.
One must not discount the need for a court to be able to control
its proceedings. The contempt power of a court should not be interpreted so as to allow a contemnor to use it offensively. The system should not encourage contemptuous behavior by which the
contemnor could so infuriate a judge that he or she has to be replaced. On several occasions the Supreme Court has stated that a
contemnor cannot force a judge out of a case,' 52 thus confirming
what the Court in Sacher identified as the "only discernible purpose of the contemptuous conduct.' 1

53

To date, however, the Court

has offered no practical guidance on how to avoid this result without suspending the contemnor's due process rights.
In order to conclude that more appellate review is necessary, one
must consider the second criticism of review as a remedy. Wholly
apart from the normative questions relating to the desirable extent
151. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
152. E.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-64 (1971); Sacher v. United States,
343 U.S. 1, 10 (1952); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
153. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 10.
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of review is the more basic question of the adequacy of review. The
inherent tensions created by the adversarial nature of court proceedings unquestionably influences the atmosphere during trials.
Transcribing into the record even that basic underlying backdrop
is impossible. To further complicate the problem, a simple trial
court record is unlikely to preserve adequately or allow re-creation
of such other factors as previous relationships and exchanges between the judge and the contemnor, the context of this particular
incident, the kind of substantive issue presented at trial, the nonverbal gestures, or the tone of voice. These inadequacies do not
prove to be fatal defects in the usefulness of review if appellate
courts recognize these limitations and are willing to consider
outside evidence in addition to the trial record.
The direct/indirect distinction bears little relationship to the
propriety of summary punishment for contempt. Even when the
contemnor has acted in front of a judge in open court, thereby establishing a direct contempt, the judge may not have known all the
relevant facts surrounding the supposed contemnor's behavior. 1 54
The more important concern from a fairness point of view is that
the court saw or heard all the relevant evidence so that it can make
the judgment. Once establishing that no fact is in controversy-the
contemnor's mental capacity, for example-then a second level inquiry should follow. This inquiry should concern whether summary
disposition is necessary in order to preserve the smooth administration of justice. 5 5 Arguably, the Ninth Circuit pursued this objective in Flynt when it recognized the two rationales of efficiency
and necessity and then proceeded to evaluate the issue in light of
56
consistency with both.
CONCLUSION

This Note surveys the rationales posited by courts in justification of the summary contempt power. Courts consistently have rec-

154. See, e.g., United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (mental capacity to
form requisite intent was a fact at issue); Vaughn v. City of Flint, 752 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir.
19185) (finding no intent to obstruct).
155. See Dobbs, supra note 1, at 224; see also United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552,
1568 (11th Cir. 1987); supra note 113.
156. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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ognized both the need for this judicial power and its potential for
abuse. The checks against abuse, appellate review and the requirement of notice and hearing for adjudication of contempts not requiring immediate action, insufficiently protect the rights of individuals. Requiring notice and hearing for contempt citations issued
after the trial is concluded result in hasty contempt citations during trial. If the standard of appellate review continues to give the
trial judge wide discretion and the appellate courts refuse to review
the factual record carefully, then serious questions of procedural
due process violations arise.
The direct/indirect distinction is unrelated to the more convincing necessity rationale advanced to justify the summary contempt
power. The most important consideration is that the judge has witnessed the relevant conduct and needs to act quickly.
Despite the possibility that a judge may have been prompted by
improper motives to make a contempt citation, this Note does not
argue for abolishing the summary power altogether. Instead, appellate courts should apply more scrutiny to the record in order to
determine that the trial judge considered all relevant facts relating
to the contempt, and also should consider the necessity of summary procedure.
Teresa S. Hanger

